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The ideal of "judicial independence" commands glowing and nearly unanimous
approval, but any serious consideration of its meaning and operation quickly uncovers a
range of problems and ambiguities.' Three important new books examine the history and
operation of "independent" judiciaries in the United States. Together they explore some
of the external challenges and internal complexities that render the ideal so problematic.
All three address the inherent tension between "government under law" and "government
by the people," and all three stake out significant and controversial positions on pressing
contemporary issues.
I. THE IDEAL UPHELD:

ORIGINAL SOURCES AND

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE

In A Distinct JudicialPower2 Scott Douglas Gerber announces two related goals.
One is "to tell [the] story [of Article 1II] by chronicling how the original 13 states and
their colonial antecedents treated their respective judiciaries"; the other is "to identify the
origins of Article III" and the "independent" federal judiciary. 3 Those seemingly
* Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. The author wishes to thank Richard
B. Bernstein and Rachel Vorspan for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. For an excellent introduction to those problems and complexities, see JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds., 2002). For a

recent study examining the functional role of judicial independence in a democracy, see Matthew C.
Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns .
The PoliticalFoundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J.
LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003).
2. SCoTr DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY

1606-1787 (2011).
3. Id. at xiv-xv. "The principal aim of my book is to shed light on the federal model by exploring the
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overlapping goals prove discordant, however, and the book breaks into two quite
different and somewhat ill fitting parts.
A. Antecedents: The Role of the Colonialand Early State Judiciaries
The much larger part of the book, accounting for well over three quarters of its
text, 4 reviews the various charters, statutes, practices, royal instructions, constitutions,
and organizational structures that marked the judicial systems of the original thirteen
colonies from their foundings through Independence, the Constitution, and a bit beyond.
It highlights sporadic and diverse efforts in the various colonies and states to alter their
court systems and sometimes to increase the independence of their judges, and it stresses
the embryonic development in several states of ideas of judicial review, which it
identifies as "the ultimate expression of judicial independence." 5 As Gerber rightly
claims, A Distinct Judicial Power "brings together for the first time a wealth of
information" on the colonial and early state judiciaries in the years "between 1606 and
1787."6 The result is a valuable summary of the development of local judicial institutions
that provides a welcome resource for students of the colonial and Revolutionary eras.
Unfortunately, those developments throw little new light on the origins of Article III.
Indeed, they seem to show that experience with the colonial and early state judiciaries
played, at most, an oblique and peripheral role in generating the "independent" federal
judiciary.
In part, the book's goal of explaining the origins of Article III falls victim to its
method of "chronicling" early judicial developments rather than analyzing them in their
full historical contexts. Its relatively formalistic approach seldom allows it to probe the
complex social forces that shaped the internal politics of the colonies, drove their
changing relationships with Great Britain and with one another, and molded evolving
ideas and practices about their courts. 7 Such a method offers only limited opportunities
to identify whatever actual "influence" the colonial and early state judiciaries may have
had on the origins of Article III.
More important, the book actually casts doubt on the claim that those judiciaries
were important to the origins of Article III. First, its ultimate finding is minimal. There
were, it concludes, "hints of judicial independence in almost all of the colonies." The
"hints," however, were often faint,9 and the most important ones did not come in the

experiences of the original states." Id. at xiv.
4. This part (chapters 3-15) fills approximately 280 of the book's 361 pages of text.
5. Id. at 115, 333. For an examination of early judicial review cases in the states, both before and after
1787, see William Michael Treanor, JudicialReview before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455 (2005).
6. GERBER, supra note 2, at xv.
7. The book seems to acknowledge this characteristic. "My legal and political science orientation likewise
explains my emphasis on texts, where constitutional ideas are memorialized, rather than solely on the
surrounding contexts." Id at xxi.
8. Id. at 325.
9. E.g., "None of the colonial charters and implementing laws of what was to become the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts treated the judicial power as independent in any fashion from the executive or legislative
powers of government," id. at 90; "none of Virginia's colonial charters said a word about the judicial power, let
alone about the importance of an independent judiciary," id at 55; the compensation clause of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights of 1776 "appeared to work against the independence of the judiciary," while its "removal
by address provision cut: against the independence of the Maryland judiciary." Id. at 141 (emphasis in
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extended colonial period but rather, and unsurprisingly, in the intense decade after 1776
when ideas about law and politics were in ferment and governmental institutions were
being newly, and often radically, restructured. 10 Second, the book shows that the
colonial and early state judiciaries varied substantially from one another and thus
presented no consensus model for the founders to emulate. Third, it suggests that their
principal "influence" may not have been in developing positive models to be followed,
but in establishing undesirable models to be avoided. The book declares at one point, that
the "framers' political theory led them to reject the preexisting colonial and state
practices."l I
That "rejection" claim and the reference to the "framers' political theory" point to
the most fundamental reason why the book's focus on the colonial and early state
judiciaries fits awkwardly with its goal of identifying the "origins of Article III." It turns
out that Gerber's real thesis is not, in fact, that the founders shaped Article III on the
basis of pre-existing judicial models or their more general experience with the colonial
and early state judiciaries. It is, rather, that they shaped it on the basis of other and quite
different considerations: their unsatisfactory experience with a courtless national
government under the Articles of Confederation 1 2 and, far more important, the
inspiration of political theories involving separation of powers. 13 Indeed, the book makes
the ideas of John Adams the single most important force shaping the content of Article
III. In his 1776 pamphlet, Thoughts on Government, Gerber declares, Adams produced
"the final step in the political theory of an independent judiciary eventually embodied in
Article III."14 His pamphlet was "a clarion call for separation of powers" that explained
"in no uncertain terms how significant an independent judiciary" was "to any form of
government dedicated to the preservation of liberty." 15 Adams advocated both tenure in
office during good behavior and compensation that could not be diminished. With a
original).
10. "A number of state constitutions adopted after the Declaration of Independence contained stirring
testaments to the judiciary's emerging-emphasis on emerging, as Part II explored-role in the founders'
political architecture." Id. at 354; accord id. at 326 ("Considerable progress was made after the colonies
declared their independence from Great Britain."). Gerber has previously emphasized the evolving nature of
American constitutional ideas and practices in the Eighteenth Century, referring, for example, to "the gradual
and somewhat hesitant turn to judicial protection of individual rights." SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 202 (1995)
11. GERBER, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis in original). The quote appears as a criticism of two
contemporary scholars who relied on "colonial and state practices" to argue that impeachment was not the only
valid method of removing federal judges from office. See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to
Remove a FederalJudge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006).
12. "The delegates who met in Philadelphia at the federal convention during the summer of 1787 agreed
that the Articles' treatment of the judicial power was problematic." GERBER, supra note 2, at 30. The Articles
of Confederation did not provide for a national judiciary or a Supreme Court, and they provided no guarantees
of independence for the special judges that it authorized Congress to appoint in narrow categories of cases
(captures, crimes on the high seas, and territorial disputes between states). See id. at 28-30.
13. In support, Gerber quotes Edward S. Corwin's general statement that the governmental "solutions" the
founders chose at the Philadelphia Convention "owed far more to the theoretical prepossessions of its members
than they did to tested institutions." Id. at 33 n.39 (quoting Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional
Theory Between the Declarationof Independence and the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention, 30 AM.
HIST. REv. 511, 511 (1925). Gerber has previously stressed his conviction that certain basic philosophical
principles explain the true nature of the Constitution and its purposes. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 10.
14. GERBER, supra note 2, at 24, 28. For Gerber's discussion of Adams in the development of separation of
powers thinking, see id. at 24-26.
15. Id. at 25.
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single exception-excluding the executive from the judicial impeachment processArticle III "contained principles identical to Adams's proposal." 1 6 The Philadelphia
Convention, Gerber concludes, "wrote Adams's theory of judicial independence into
Article III."17 Thus, in spite of the book's ostensible focus and the great bulk of its
content, its principal argument is that the origins of Article III lay not in the pre-1787
judiciaries but in the minds of a long line of political theorists whose ideas culminated in
1776 with the thinking of John Adams.18 Moreover, it is quite clear that the earlier
theorists in that long line did not draw any significant ideas from their experiences with
the colonial and early state judiciaries. 19
One need not question the importance of Adams's ideas, moreover, to find
Gerber's claim about their influence in need of qualification. His discussion ignores the
fact that Adams based his idea of separation of powers on the principle of balanced
government and that he stressed most centrally the importance not of establishing an
independent judiciary but of weakening and dividing the powerful and dangerous
legislative branch and of substantially strengthening the executive in a variety of ways,
including giving it a veto over legislation. 20 It also ignores the fact that Adams's idea of
separation of powers reflected not just the idea of dividing legislative, executive, and
judicial powers-hardly an unknown idea by 1776 21-but also the ancient and quite
different idea of balancing government between society's three social orders-monarch,
nobles, and commons.22 It ignores, further, the fact that Adams stressed the fundamental
importance not only of judicial independence but also of the people's rights to trial by
jury and to elect a house of commons as essential requirements for protecting their
liberties.23 Thus, the book oversimplifies Adams's views and overemphasizes his focus
on the judiciary. Finally, of course, it ignores a great many other historical complexities,
including the fact that by 1787 there were quite a number of influential people
advocating the establishment of an independent judiciary and supporting the drafting and

16. Id. at 26. Shugerman agrees, noting that the "state constitutional conventions followed Adams's lead."
JED H. SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND JUDICIAL POWER IN
AMERICA 31 (forthcoming 2012).
17. GERBER, supranote 2, at 334.
18. Gerber calls Adams "the American founding's most sophisticated political theorist." Id. at 24. He has
long been an admirer of Adams. See, e.g., GERBER, supranote 10, 38-39, 87-89, 218 n.1 11. He is hardly alone.
E.g., C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, JOHN ADAMS AND THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 87, 107, 190-191 (1998); DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001).
19. The seven pre-Adams theorists that Gerber discusses are all non-Americans, five of whom died long
before the colonies were founded: Aristotle, Polybius, Marsilius of Padua, Sir John Fortescue, Gasparo
Contarini, King Charles I, and Montesquieu. GERBER, supra note 2, at 3-23.
20. See, e.g., JOHN R. HOWE, JR., THE CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS 90-98 (1966).
21. E.g., "'Every plan of govemment talked of at the time of the Virginia convention of 1776' provided for
the separation of powers." GERBER, supra note 2, at 55 (quoting A. E. Dick Howard, "Forthe Common
Benefit": Constitutional History in Virginia As A Casebookfor the Modern Constitution-Maker,54 VA. L.
REV. 816, 881 (1968)).
22. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 577 n.15
(1998 ed. 1998) (citing ZOLTAN HARASZTI, JOHN ADAMS AND THE PROPHETS OF PROGRESS 27-28, 310 (1952).
C. Bradley Thompson, who challenges Wood's interpretation of Adams on several points, nonetheless agrees
that in the 1770s and 1780s Adams incorporated traditional ideas about the need to balance social orders in his
general thinking about the utility of "mechanical checks and balances of intragovernmental institutions." See
THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 248-49.
23. THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 84-85.
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ratification of Article III.24
Pressing his point, Gerber also argues that Adams's influence extended far beyond
Article III and proved "influential in a number of state constitutional conventions."25
Sometimes quickly and sometimes belatedly, he maintains, the original thirteen states
shifted their judiciaries toward the "federal model." 26 While Adams's ideas did have an
impact in several states,27 they also failed in the long run to command assent in most
states. Gerber, however, does not pursue nineteenth-century developments when the
overwhelming majority of states moved away from Adams's "federal model" and
adopted popular election of judges, limited judicial terms, and easier methods of
removal. 28
B. IntellectualOrigins and Contemporary Threat
The other, and more important, part of A Distinct JudicialPower consists of four
chapters that sandwich its long middle section on the colonial and early state judiciaries.
Two initial chapters provide, respectively, a "history of ideas" about separation of
powers and judicial independence and a summary of the debates that surrounded the
adoption of Article III. Two concluding chapters elaborate the book's argument that an
independent judiciary is necessary for both judicial review and the protection of
individual rights. The last of these, formally labeled an "Appendix," identifies the book's
underlying contemporary purpose-to discredit recent theories of "popular
constitutionalism."
The two introductory chapters establish Gerber's intellectual framework. The first
provides an abstract and timeless capsule summary of the "contributions" to separation-

24. Gerber's claim goes well beyond the more balanced view advanced by another of Adams's many
scholarly admirers. By 1787 "John Adams's political thought was squarely within the mainstream of Federalist
thought." Id. at 264. Thompson further stated:
Adams's advocacy of a bicameral legislature and an independent executive bears more
than a superficial resemblance to the constitutional structure created by the Philadelphia
Convention and to the principles and reasoning contained in The Federalist.The people
to whom his ideas later became irrelevant were nevertheless operating within the
framework of a constitutional system that Adams played an important role in creating.
Id.at 265-66.
25. GERBER, supranote 2, at 25.
26. "[O]nly Virginia and North Carolina completely constitutionalizedthe idea of judicial independence in
the federal conception of the judicial institution prior to the Federal Constitution of 1787. Not surprisingly,
John Adams's Thoughts on Government proved dispositive in those states." Id. at 327 (emphasis in original).
South Carolina "embraced the federal conception of judicial independence" in 1790, while Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Georgia moved closer to the federal model later in the same decade. Id. at 328-29. Conversely,
Connecticut did not make its judiciary an independent branch of government until 1818; New Jersey's
constitution did not provide for judicial tenure during good behavior until 1947; and Rhode Island "did not
abandon legislative supremacy until 2004." Id. "Even today ... the New Hampshire judiciary is not fully
independent in the federal conception of the judicial power." Id. at 121.
27. E.g., THOMPSON, supra note 18, at xiii, 265.
28. Those later developments are examined in Shugerman's book, People's Courts, discussed in Part II of
this essay. Compare JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 98-99 (2009 ed.

2009) ("(T]he American constitutional tradition encompasses a broader conception of the executive and
judicial veto powers than is evident from a study of the federal constitution alone. . . . Given that state
constitution makers have had more frequent opportunities than their federal counterparts to respond to these
developments and to implement institutional reforms, a strong case can be made for viewing these distinctive
state institutions as a more authentic expression of the accumulated wisdom and experience of the American
constitutional tradition.").
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of-powers ideas made by eight thinkers, beginning with Aristotle and flowering fully
with Adams. 29 The "political theory of an independent judiciary," Gerber there
announces, "is the culmination of the work of eight political theorists writing over the
span of 22 centuries, with each building on the contributions of the others." 30 The second
chapter identifies the elements of Article III that establish an independent judiciary:
tenure during good behavior, compensation that cannot be diminished, and clear
separation from the other branches of government. Those elements show that "the
framers strongly believed that the judiciary should be independent." 31
The two final chapters carry the book's ultimate normative theses. The
"Conclusion" argues that the founders understood that judicial independence was
essential to protect individual rights, that judicial review flowed from and required
judicial independence, and that the "genesis" of judicial review lay in "horizontal"
separation-of-powers ideas rather than "vertical" ideas of hierarchy.32 The first two
arguments seem both relatively standard and exceptionally abstract, 33 and Gerber
acknowledges that the evidence supporting the third-which justifies judicial review of
actions taken by coordinate federal branches-is "not unambiguous." 34 He claims,
however, that his timeless "history of ideas" about separation of powers demonstrates its
accuracy. 35 Thus, the "Conclusion" joins his first two chapters in seeking to establish an
"originalist" foundation for the "independence" of the federal judiciary and for its
obligation to protect individual rights and its authority for a comprehensive practice of
judicial review.
The last chapter, labeled an "Appendix," carries the book's bluntest message: "that
popular constitutionalism is wrong."36 Singling out the work of Mark Tushnet, Cass
Sunstein, and Larry Kramer, 37 it argues that those scholars misread history and
misunderstand both the nature of the Constitution and the significance of Article III.
Their failures are rooted in the fact that they are "Leftist scholars" who share an
"unshakeable dedication to the Left's political agenda."38 Indeed, as if to make its point
as evocative as possible, the book equates the arguments of the three with "a kind of
29. See GERBER, supra note 2, at 3-23. Historians dispute the extent to which Adams was influenced by
various earlier political theorists. For a sophisticated analysis of Adams's intellectual influences see
THOMPSON, supra note 18, at ch. 7-10.

30. GERBER, supra note 2, at 325.
31. Id.at37.
32. Id. at 333.
33. Shugerman, for example, agrees that judicial independence arose from ideas of separation of powers
and that it seemed necessary for a muscular and consistent practice of judicial review." SHUGERMAN, supra
note 16, at 24, 47, 94, 139-40.
34. GERBER, supra note 2, at 332.
35. As Gerber phrases it, "an investigation into the origins of judicial review that takes seriously the history
of ideas reveals that the genesis of the doctrine [of judicial review] is more accurately traced to the 'horizontal'
idea of separation of powers." GERBER, supra note 2, at 333. Such a "history of ideas" seems entirely
inadequate given the sophisticated and massive literature on the origins of judicial review. For a recent
contribution, with an introductory commentary on much of the earlier literature, see, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER,
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).

36. GERBER, supra note 2, at 345.
37. Id.; see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

38. GERBER, supra note 2, at 352, 358.
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judicial Brezhnev Doctrine." 39
Several of Gerber's comments are sound. He is right that Tushnet, Sunstein, and
Kramer hold certain political and constitutional views in common. He is also right in
maintaining that at least some varieties of "popular constitutionalism" seem misguided
and inconsistent with the Constitution's nature and structure. 4 0 If some of its advocates
failed to recognize that truth or gave it insufficient weight, the sources, tactics, funding,
rhetoric, and organization of certain contemporary and ostensibly "popular" groups may
well lead them to reconsider their views. Finally, Gerber is right in maintaining that
"popular constitutionalism" is an example of "partisan constitutional theorizing."41
Reacting to the contemporary Court, many scholars have pursued a range of critical
efforts designed to challenge its rulings, and those efforts surely include varieties of
"popular constitutionalism."
On two points, however, his comments are flawed. First, while Tushnet, Kramer,
and Sunstein might, in contemporary terms, fairly be labeled "liberal," "progressive," or
"left of center," it is quite a different matter to brand them as "Leftists" with a unifying
capital "L" and to charge them with an "unshakeable dedication" to some apparently
dangerous and predetermined "political agenda" of "the Left[]." 42 It is also quite a
different matter to do so while identifying them as pushing, or at least fellow-traveling
with, their own "Brezhnev Doctrine." 43
Second, Gerber is mistaken in limiting his "partisan" charge as he does. His
reference to "partisan constitutional theorizing" comes in a sentence that reads in full as
follows: "Popular Constitutionalism is simply the latest reincarnation of partisan

39. Id at 356. The book explains the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as the Soviet Union's justification for its
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: "what we have, we keep." Id at 356 & n.84. Gerber notes that Tushnet "is
a Marxist." Id. at 347 n.15.
40. The idea of popular constitutionalism "is deeply ambiguous" and can carry a wide range of diverse
meanings and implications. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?Constitutionalisn?,118 HARv.
L. REV. 1594, 1628 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 37). For thoughtful - and highly critical reviews of the other books Gerber attacks, see, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE
L. J. 541 (1999) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 37) and Neal Devins, The Democracy-ForcingConstitution,
97 MICH. L. REv. 1971 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 37). Gerber suggests a somewhat more
sophisticated critique of "popular constitutionalism" in an earlier book. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 10, at
133, 200-02. For a review of much of the literature and a critical examination of possible institutional reforms
implementing versions of "popular constitutionalism," see David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular
Constitutionalism,110 COLUM. L. REv. 2047 (2010).
41. GERBER, supra note 2, at 347. Others, myself included, have made that point. See, e.g., EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL
INQUIRY 159 (2007).
42. GERBER, supra note 2, at 358. The capitalized term appears at different places and in different forms.
See, e.g., id. at 348, 352, and 357. Gerber is particularly critical on the issue of "affirmative action," which he
terms "the sacred cow of the Left." Id. at 356.
43. It is worth noting that the three targeted scholars differ from one another in many ways and that they
also differ from other contemporary scholars who could also be classified as "popular constitutionalists" whether or not Gerber would term them "Leftists" - and who also differ from one another. E.g., 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541
(1999).
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constitutional theorizing that dates from [James Bradley] Thayer's famous essay." 44
Whatever else-unwise, misconceived, or dangerous-"popular constitutionalism"
might be, it is not "simply" so. That is, "popular constitutionalism," like every other
example of serious "constitutional theorizing" in America, is a social, political, cultural,
and intellectual phenomenon that is complex, evolving, strategic, and multi-valued. 4 5
More important, "popular constitutionalism" is not the "latest reincarnation" of a new
phenomenon that "dates from Thayer's famous essay," which was published in 1893. It
is not uniquely the product of "modem" forces, nor is it the simple result of "sociological
jurisprudence" or "legal realism." 4 6 Rather, it is one more in a continuous if shifting line
of such "reincarnations" whose origins lie with the nation's origins and whose
dynamic
of American
the
politico-intellectual
characterizes
appearance
constitutionalism. Contemporary "popular constitutionalism" is, in fact, merely one part
of a recent phase in the same contested and value-laden practice of constitutional
argumentation that engaged the colonists and Revolutionaries, the Constitution's
supporters and opponents, the Federalists and Jeffersonians, and all those who
subsequently joined the nation's ongoing constitutional debate. 47 If Gerber's full
sentence is intended either to simplify "popular constitutionalism" into some historically
aberrant and unrooted error 48 or to quarantine it from earlier and purportedly nonpolitical "constitutional theorizing"-whether that of John Adams or any other
constitutional theorist, including those who claim to be 'originalists'-it is itself badly
misguided. Some ideas and some arguments are surely better than others, but all are
rooted in specific historical contexts, usually inspired by particularly pressing problems,
49
and shaped by the values, purposes, and assumptions of those who articulate them.
As a general matter, A Distinct Judicial Power seems unlikely to satisfy or
persuade most historians. Its approach is too formalistic and abstract, 5 0 and its "history
of ideas" bears little resemblance to the sophisticated analyses of scholars who write in
the intellectual history tradition associated with Arthur 0. Lovejoy.51 In fact, the book is

44. GERBER, supra note 2, at 347.
45. Alexander Bickel, for example, surely a sophisticated constitutional theorist, embraced a form of
"popular constitutionalism." See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGREsS 90 (1970).

46. Gerber has previously suggested that those forces spurred the emergence of "theories of constitutional
interpretation" in the late nineteenth century. GERBER, supra note 10, at 1-2.
47. See, e.g., ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010);

PURCELL, supra note 41.
48. Consider for example the complexities discussed in People's Courts, in particular its argument that the
move in the states to judicial elections was an effort to implement the separation of powers and to protect
judicial independence. SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at ch. 3.
49. Lee's book, JudicialRestraint in America, discussed in Part III below, nicely illustrates this general
proposition in the area of relatively technical constitutional doctrine.
50. Gerber's approach contrasts sharply with the incisive historical analyses developed, for example, in
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 (2005), and MARY SARAH BILDER, THE
TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004).

51. See, e.g., John Patrick Diggins, Arthur 0. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History, 67 J. HIST.
IDEAS 181 (2006). Gerber's discussion, for example, fails to consider the complex impact that separation of
powers ideas had on the concept of judicial authority and the power of judges to void governmental acts.
Compare Gerber's A Distinct JudicialPower, with HAMBURGER, supra note 35, at ch. 17 (suggesting that
Madisonian ideas of "checks and balances" limited older conceptions of judicial authority and exposed judges
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more appropriately viewed not as history, but as contemporary legal argument, an
elaborately detailed and apparently teleological chronicle with a skeletal normative claim
and a clear contemporary target.
As his "history of ideas" treats separation of powers as an abstraction, Gerber's
discussion of judicial independence, judicial review, and the protection of individual
rights does the same, and on that level his claims seem bland if hardly indisputable. 52
Indeed, he might even agree that an acceptance of those ideas on such a general level is
compatible with most brands of contemporary "constitutional theorizing." 53 He notes,
for example, that Lawrence H. Tribe, "a political liberal," wrote a scathing rejection of
Kramer's "popular constitutionalism." 54
According full honor to lofty abstractions, however, the truly serious and
perplexing questions remain. What, exactly, does "judicial independence" mean,
especially in the context of today's intensely politicized judicial appointment process?
When, and under what conditions, should the power of judicial review be exercised?
Which individual rights should receive judicial protection, and how much protection, and
under what conditions, and with what limitations? 5 5
Critics of the contemporary Court, including "popular constitutionalists," believe
in the protection of individual rights as much as Gerber does, but they also recognize a
new and ominous threat. The contemporary Court has been inhospitable and sometimes
acutely hostile to many of those rights. Over the past several decades it has regularly
limited or denied the rights of ordinary Americans against both government and
business, and increasingly it has invented ever more sweeping and "activist" ways to
deprive ordinary Americans of the opportunity to gain access to an "independent" federal
court in their efforts to protect those rights. 56 The contemporary Court's substantive and

to new and constraining political pressures).
52. "I argue that judicial independence is not a useful, analytic concept. It does not promote either our
understanding of how courts function or the design of desirable judicial institutions." Lewis A. Komhauser, Is
Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45,45 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
53. "Both liberal and conservative thinkers conclude that the 'rule of law' depends upon impartiality, equal
and consistent treatment, the protection of general fundamental principles protected from arbitrary power-i.e.,
judicial independence." SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 13.
54. GERBER, supra note 2, at 361 (citing Lawrence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2004, sec. 7 (Book Review), at 32).
55. Gerber would presumably attempt to answer those questions by recourse to the Founders "original"
natural rights philosophy which, he has argued, provides the correct basis for construing the Constitution.
GERBER, supra note 10, at 15, 58, 89-90, 197-200. Most constitutional questions can be properly answered, he
maintains, if one has an accurate understanding of that "original" natural rights philosophy. See SCoTT
DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 163-87 (1999). Indeed,
Gerber suggests that the natural rights philosophy is "objective" and that it should be a requirement for
membership on Supreme Court. The devices available for checking the Court - constitutional amendments,
impeachment, judicial restraint, and the appointments process - "if properly used, can help ensure that the
Court interprets the Constitution in accordance with the natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence, rather than in light of the moral and political convictions of particular justices." GERBER, supra
note 10, at 161. Ironically, Gerber maintains that Justice Clarence Thomas, who claims allegiance to those
natural law principles, has failed to apply them properly. Justice Thomas, Gerber concluded in an earlier study,
is "merely an especially fascinating example of the realist maxim that judges read their policy preferences into
the law they are interpreting." GERBER, supra, at 198.
56. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure,60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367
(1996).
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procedural restrictions are, in fact, far more dangerous to both individual rights and the
rule of law than are any recent and reactive theories of "popular constitutionalism."
II. THE IDEAL EXPLORED: POLITICS, REFORM, AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

Jed H. Shugerman's provocative and insightful book, The People's Courts,57
reflects many of the same general values that inform Gerber's book. It emphasizes the
fundamental importance of judicial independence, locates its roots in ideas of separation
of powers, and affirms the belief that judicial selections are best made on the basis of
"merit." It agrees, moreover, with a fundamental point that Gerber has previously
acknowledged, that the central challenge plaguing judicial selection processes is their
unavoidably "political" nature. 5 8
Beyond those shared general views, however, the books have little in common.
Shugerman concentrates not on the colonial period but on the period from the
Constitution to the present, and he traces the states' well-known path not toward but
away from the federal model. 5 9 While Gerber presents judicial independence as an
abstract normative principle and accepts the idea of judicial merit as a relatively
objective standard,60 Shugerman examines the former as an ever-changing institutional
challenge and the latter as a largely immeasurable criterion.61 Indeed, for Shugerman,
ideas of both judicial independence and judicial merit have varied significantly over time
in both meaning and significance. 62
Examining efforts to institutionalize the ideal of judicial independence, The
People's Courts argues that the states have struggled through five distinct stages. The
"premodern," or colonial, judiciary featured dependent judges who were often elected
officials exercising mixed judicial, legislative, and executive powers. During the
eighteenth century an "aristocratic" model developed, embracing ideas of judicial
independence, separation of powers, and tenure in office during good behavior. The
1840s and 1850s brought "judicial democracy," the increased use of judicial elections to
protect the independence of the courts from the corrupting use of appointment powers by
governors and legislatures. The 1930s saw the emergence of "judicial meritocracy,"
efforts to check the sway of corrupting party influence over judicial elections by making
nominations and appointments dependent on some type of professional "merit"
screening. Finally, the late twentieth century witnessed the advent of "judicial
plutocracy," a system in which judicial selections, largely based on popular elections,
were increasingly "shaped by direct cash transactions between lawyers, clients, and the

57. SHUGERMAN, supra note 16.
58. GERBER, supra note 10, at 157-61 (discussing appointments to the federal judiciary).
59. "Almost ninety percent of state judges face some kind of popular election. Thirty-eight states put all of
their judges up before the voters." SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 6.
60. GERBER, supra note 10, at 157-61.
61. For example, "[A]cademic studies are mixed or inconclusive about whether merit selects more
experienced candidates or produces better judges, in part because it is hard to quantify judicial quality."
SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 415. See id. at 14-15.
62. For example, in the early twentieth century, "the label 'merit' had been used to distinguish good
government from party patronage and to contrast American equality of opportunity from socialism. By the
1970s it was also used to critique racial affirmative action." Id. at 389.
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judges who hear their cases." 63 This last and contemporary phase, Shugerman declares,
has become an "increasingly contentious practice."64
Concentrating on the last three stages, The People's Courts provides detailed
analyses of developments in dozens of states and seeks to identify when, where, and why
the successive forces of reform coalesced and ultimately won the day. In doing so, it
illuminates the complexity of American legal politics, the ever-changing nature of its
focal issues, and the imperfect nature of all judicial selection procedures.
The shift toward "judicial democracy" in the mid-nineteenth century revealed the
irony and unpredictability of judicial reform. Impetus for change grew out of acute
pressures generated by the long depression of the late 1830s and 1840s and an intense
public anger over the irresponsibility and corruption of state legislatures in incurring
huge and wasteful public debts.65 The spread of judicial elections institutionalized the
era's anti-legislative animus and gave judges a new democratic legitimacy. The result,
however, was not "popular" rule but a new anti-majoritarian judicial orientation that
brought more frequent invalidations of legislative enactments.66 Popular elections thus
helped inspire "anti-popular" attitudes in state judiciaries and contributed to the rise of
substantive due process ideas long before those ideas reached the United States Supreme
Court. 67
Even more broadly, Shugerman argues that "the 1840s and 1850s were a turning
point in favor of judicial review and judicial power, driven by the first generation of
elected judges."68 Prior to this period, the courts articulated theories of judicial review,
but they were nonetheless politically weak and their decisions remained tentative and
qualified. The "specific context of these [early judicial review] cases illustrates how
fragile these courts were, and how a court decision might trumpet formal legal power
precisely because the court knew it lacked political power." 69 Although the Marshall
Court and some state courts erected "a foundation for more power later," they did not
exercise that power widely, commonly, or vigorously. 70 "American judges built the
doctrine of judicial review into a more robust and regular power only once those [later]
reformers decided to harness it as part of judicial democracy in the 1840s-1850s.,,71

63. Id. at 20.
64. Id. at 20.
65. For a useful review of the historical debate over the rise of elective judiciaries in the states, see Caleb
Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum
America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993) (concluding that elective judiciaries arose from a general suspicion
and distrust not merely of legislative power but of all governmental power).
66. Once "judges actually became elected, they wrote as skeptics of democracy and increasingly turned to
countermajoritarian theories." SHUGERMAN, supranote 16, at 207-08.
67. Shugerman's argument implicates a number of historical debates involving not only the spread of
elective judiciaries in the mid-nineteenth century states but also the rise of substantive due process. For a recent
review and discussion of the latter issue, see Matthew J. Lindsay, Response, In Search of "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism," 123 HARv. L. REV. F. 55 (2010).
68. SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 48.
69. Id. at 50. See, id. at 78-83, 92-93.
70. Republicans viewed the pronouncements of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), as
"empty threats that would not be enforced in other venues," and thought that the more important case at the
time, Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (t Cranch) 299 (1803), demonstrated "that the Supreme Court had capitulated to
the Republicans on the judiciary." SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 79.
71. SHUGERMAN, supranote 16, at 93.
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The social and institutional results of "judicial democracy," however, were hardly
simple. Popular elections also led state court judges to react with a new sympathy to
some of the dangers brought by late nineteenth-century industrialism. Many responded
forcefully, for example, to the public outcry over the social causes and consequences of
the Johnstown Flood of 1889 and imposed new responsibilities on business by adopting
theories of strict tort liability for hazardous activities.72 Thus, judicial elections
empowered judges vis a vis legislatures, and the judicial reaction to the Johnstown flood
"offers a hint that longer terms might make elected judges more responsive to recent
events" rather than less. Indeed, Shugerman notes, several states "lengthened terms [in
office] explicitly to give judges more freedom from special interests and from political
corruption." 73
Similarly, mid-twentieth-century campaigns for merit-selection plans revealed the
varying social and political conditions that made reform possible. Business generally
supported such efforts while labor opposed them, and reform was achievable only when
and where "the climate was just right." 74 In rural states business was too weak to push
through merit plans, and in heavily industrialized states labor was too strong for business
to overcome. Thus, Shugerman concludes, it was in "rural-but-industrializing states,"
where business had grown strong but labor had not yet caught up, that a window of
opportunity opened. Reform could not be achieved, however, unless other underlying
conditions-apparent crime waves, racial tensions, corruption scandals, regional
sympathies, or Cold War politics-created acute public concerns and anxieties and, even
then, only if an organized and astute political leadership was able to provide direction
and effectively link those concerns and anxieties to the cause of merit selection. 75
From his historical survey Shugerman draws several conclusions. The most
traditional and heartening is that Americans have long recognized the fundamental
importance of judicial independence and that they pressed their successive reform
campaigns for the precise purpose of securing that ideal in practice. Judicial
independence "has been surprisingly resilient and popular throughout American
history." 76 His other conclusions, however, deeply complicate the significance of the
first. One is that in all stages of reform "economic interests drove the design and
redesign of judicial selection." 77 Another is that the concept of judicial "independence"
itself is "so contextual and malleable that a well-financed campaign can usually put itself
in the corner of judicial independence against one vilified interest or another, right or
left." A third is that judicial independence is at risk in any and every selection process.

72. Id. at 259-65.
73. Id. at 265.
74. Id. at 301.
75. Id. at 301, 391; see, e.g., id. at 302-23 (California); id. at 325-42 (Missouri).
76. Id. at 11. The "core" meaning of judicial independence, Shugerman writes, "refers to a judge's
insulation from the political and personal consequences of his or her legal decisions." Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 391. "At each stage of reform, economic interests were able to win over enough public support in
the name of judicial independence." Id. at 424.
78. Id. at 418-19. The same is true, of course, about underlying separation-of-powers ideas which have
repeatedly been used to undergird conflicting and contradictory views on many issues, including judicial
selection and tenure. See, e.g., Purcell, supranote 41, at 38-47.
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There is "no escape from politics, but only different forms of political influence." 79
Reforms "succeeded in insulating the courts from one set of evils, but they often exposed
courts to new political forces-sometimes unwittingly, sometimes wittingly."80 Thus,
the fundamental issue is never about securing judicial "independence" in some pure
form, but rather about designing specific selection procedures to best insulate judges
from whatever outside pressures seem most dangerous and corrupting at any given time.
Shugerman's last and most pressing conclusion comes in his final two chapters.
Like Gerber's "Appendix," these chapters reveal his book's animating prescriptive
purpose and announce what the author regards as the paramount contemporary threat to
judicial independence. For Shugerman, it is "judicial plutocracy," not "popular
constitutionalism," that must be fought and defeated.
"Judicial plutocracy," Shugerman argues, is both different from, and far more
dangerous than, its various predecessors. 8 1 The preceding "aristocratic," "democratic,"
and "merit-plan" models sought not to weaken judicial independence but to strengthen it
against outside forces that were seen as particularly corrupting and oppressive. "Each set
of reforms reflected a new perspective on the American institution of the separation of
powers." 82 In contrast, the "plutocratic" model seeks to limit judicial independence and
capture state courts for partisan ends. Thus, unlike its predecessors, "judicial plutocracy"
presents a potentially lethal threat to judicial independence.
Although Shugerman points to the contributions of trial lawyers and other groups
commonly associated with the Democratic Party,83 he identifies business interests and
the Republican Party as the primary practitioners and beneficiaries of "judicial
plutocracy."84 Recent judicial elections "are simply part of a larger pattern: business
interests find ways of playing by the existing rules of judicial selection to win, and when
they stop winning, they campaign to change the rules." 85 Their goal is not to ensure
judicial independence but to establish a friendly and fostering bench. "After spending
their capital (political and financial) on campaigns for merit reforms," Shugerman
maintains, "businesses returned to trying to win judicial elections outright, and they did
so by capitalizing on socially conservative issues and by pouring money into key
races." 86 Across the nation, judicial elections in the 1990s cost $60 million in direct
campaign contributions, while in the following decade that amount shot up to $200
million.87 In 2004 spending on Alabama Supreme Court elections stood at $7.5 million;
in 2006 it jumped to $13 million. In the process, judicial elections were transformed

79. Id at 20.
80. Id at 423.
81. Progressives failed to free judicial appointments from politics, in part because they themselves
remained partisans, but they helped Americans understand that "[p]artisan elections created a judiciary that was
more easily captured by ideology and special interests." Id. at 280.
82. Id. at 422.
83. In one famous case, Houston trial lawyer Joe Jamail donated $10,000 to the trial judge and, when the
case was on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, donated another $355,000 to its justices. Id. at 406.
84. Shugerman highlights the role of Karl Rove in judicial election campaigns in both Texas and Alabama,
including "some disturbing allegations about Rove's behind-the-scenes tactics." Id. at 403-13.
85. Id.at419.
86. Id. at 393.
87. Id. at 411-12.
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"from local to national" contests that were focused on "national hot-button issues" and
During the past twenty-five years such
directed by "national political operatives."
campaigns have shifted the supreme courts of California, Texas, and Alabama from
Democratic to Republican hands, 89 and more recently they have begun invading ever
more judicial elections at all levels and all across the country.
Seeking workable remedies to counter the challenge, Shugerman begins with
lessons from his history. The "key to judicial independence is not front-end selection, but
rather, back-end retention and job security," what he calls "general" judicial
independence. 90 Particularly valuable then - especially when combined with "merit
selection" systems - are longer terms of office and "retention" elections in which voters
can choose only between retaining or dismissing sitting judges. 9 1 The "stark pattern" he
sees in the costliest judicial campaigns confirms that conclusion. "All of the milliondollar races between 2000 and 2009" were "contested" elections. "None of the retention
elections came close to that level of spending, and in particular, the merit-plan retention
elections had almost no money at all."92 Merit-retention systems offer strong job security
for a variety of reasons, including the advantages of incumbency. Perhaps most
important, they reduce "the incentives for a judge's opponents to invest in her defeat
because those opponents do not choose the replacement." 9 3
Still, Shugerman cautions, merit retention elections provide no guarantee. All merit
plans are subject to both manipulation and political pressure, and "there are signs that
aggressive hot-button campaigning and interest group spending are coming to merit
retention elections." 94 Thus, the situation is grave. "America is now at a crossroads
between a flawed-but-promising judicial meritocracy and a flawed-and worsening
judicial plutocracy." 9 5
Beyond merit retention elections, Shugerman proposes other innovative reforms to
check "judicial plutocracy." He suggests requiring 60% majorities for dismissals,
ensuring greater bipartisan balance and broader public participation in screening
commissions, and focusing judicial elections on overturning specific decisions rather
than on dismissing judges. He also recommends regulating and limiting the role of
money in judicial elections. Here, Shugerman readily acknowledges that the Supreme

88. Id at 393.
89. Id at 394-414.
90. Id. at 21. General independence "simply means a judge is more insulated from direct political pressure
from any source," and it requires job security provisions such as long terms and protection of jurisdiction,
salary, and institutional resources. "Relative" independence refers to "methods of judicial selection" which
make judges "more independent from one set of powers, but more accountable to another." Id. at 13-14. Merit
plans, for example, "replaced one kind of insider politics with another (bar associations and professional
expertise), and it was designed to reduce the public spectacle of'judges campaigning." Id. at 422-23.
91. The "most important issue is not how a judge wins a seat, but how long the judge gets to hold it without
worrying about winning it again." Id at 437. Support for merit selection and retention elections has been
described as the current "progressive" position. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Introduction to JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 52, at 5-6.
92. SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 414.
93. Id. at415.
94. Id. at 417. Judges who have made unusually unpopular decisions have lost retention elections. Id. at 417
(three Iowa supreme court judges lost retention elections after ruling in favor of a state constitutional right to
gay marriage).
95. Id. at 21.
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Court has sorely exacerbated the problem of maintaining an independent judiciary, 96 but
he proposes a new constitutional basis for taming the power of money and political
organization. Relying on Caperton v. Massey,97 he suggests that due process ideas could
be used to protect judicial independence by requiring full campaign disclosures in
judicial elections and mandating that judges recuse themselves in cases involving their
campaign donors. 98
Shugerman is right that Caperton offers possibilities, and his proposal is a worthy
one, indeed hardly more than the barest common sense in contemporary circumstances.
Unfortunately, its potential in theory has doubtful promise in practice. In the first
instance, making Caperton an effective remedy would require a broad interpretation of
its principle that allowed it to reach well beyond the bald and exceptional facts the case
presented. Further, currently allowable campaign finance techniques would likely allow
easy circumvention of even a moderately broadened Caperton. Perhaps most important,
making its principle effective would require a bench determined on enforcement, and the
combination of the current Court's reigning ideology and the self-interest of elective
state judiciaries makes such a precondition seem an unlikely possibility.
The People's Courts is both timely and astute. Exploring the tensions between the
ideal of an independent judiciary and the practice of popular government, it shows that
compromises between the two are unavoidable and that effective reform must seek to
meet ever-changing threats. Like advocates of "popular constitutionalism," Shugerman
affirms the right of the people to influence the selection of their judges and to determine
the content of their laws; like critics of "popular constitutionalism," he warns equally
that judicial elections can severely threaten the independence of the judiciary. Most
pointedly, he insists that under contemporary conditions voters may be too easily misled,
confused, distracted, or simply overwhelmed by the massive and seemingly everexpanding power of money, organization, and partisan political expertise.
Unfortunately, Shugerman's warning is not only well justified, but also far more
widely applicable than he indicates. The challenge of "judicial plutocracy" presents an
especially acute danger today because it is merely one component of a sweeping and
interrelated set of challenges that currently threaten the nation's noblest ideals and
values. It is but one manifestation of the globalization of capital, the spread of an
untrammeled market ideology, the acceptance of national policies that foster a growing
economic inequality, and a political system increasingly shaped by the financial support
and consequently effective policy demands of an internationalized, corporate
managerial-investor-political donor segment. What is at stake is not judicial
independence alone but also responsive popular government, equality under the law, and
basic American ideas of social and economic justice for all. 9 9

96. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (expanding broadly the right of corporations to make
campaign contributions); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (declaring statutory limit
on "electioneering communications" by corporation unconstitutional); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765 (2002) (voiding state rule prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed
political and legal issues).
97. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
98. SHUGERMAN, supra note 16, at 438-39.
99. A growing literature confirms Shugerman's concerns and shows their relevance to other and far wider
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Indeed, by identifying the contemporary United States Supreme Court as an
institution creating major obstacles to the maintenance of an independent judiciary,
Shugerman highlights what might seem a paradox. Judicial independence can become its
own worst enemy. However, since the contemporary Court has also used its power to
restrict the rights of ordinary Americans and to limit their access to the independent
federal courts, its obstacle creation should hardly come as a surprise. Perhaps it is not
even a paradox. The cases restricting individual rights and court access and the cases
expanding the power of corporations over the nation's elections do, after all, serve
essentially the same basic social policy. That stark fact spotlights the contemporary
relevance of the third book under review.
III. THE IDEAL EXPLORED FURTHER: VALUES, DOCTRINES,
AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Like Gerber and Shugerman, Evan Tsen Lee readily accepts the ideal of an
independent judiciary, but his focus and approach in Judicial Restraint in America1 0 0
differs markedly from theirs. Unlike Gerber, who links the virtue of an independent
federal judiciary to the goal of constitutional "originalism," Lee has little faith in
"originalist" jurisprudence. Rather, he accepts the fact that doctrines evolve and adapt,
and his book demonstrates that the Court's current standing and judicial restraint
jurisprudence has scant foundation in "originalist" sources. Unlike Shugerman, who
examines external factors that limit judicial independence, Lee probes the internal
operations of judicial independence in practice in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Highlighting the Court's unavoidable connections with society, he
shows the complex ways in which broad social changes and personal value commitments
led individual justices to remold the law and give its rules and principles new meanings
and applications. An "independent judiciary," he thus cautions, is a complex institution,
for it also means a judiciary that enjoys discretion and, within broad limits, lacks
accountability.
Lee's incisive and carefully reasoned book traces the evolution of ideas about
judicial restraint, especially the doctrine of "standing," from Marbury v. Madison10 1 to
the present. From John Marshall's time to the 1920s, it argues, the federal courts denied
remedies to plaintiffs who could not show an "injury" to a vested "legal right." The
"injury" requirement was no preliminary threshold matter but rather an integral part of a
claim's common-law merits.1 02 While Marshall and later nineteenth and early twentieth-

issues. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE (2008); JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (rev. ed. 2008); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS:
How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); JEFF
MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT

(2011).
100. EVAN TsEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS WAS INVENTED (2011). In the interest of full disclosure, I read Lee's book in manuscript and authored

a laudatory "blurb" for the book's jacket.
101. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. E.g., LEE, supra note 100, at 18 (discussing Justice Marshall); id. at 32 (discussing Brewer and
Peckham).
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century judges (Lee focuses on Justices David A. Brewer, Rufus Peckham, and George
Sutherland) altered and expanded the category of "legal rights" in order to protect private
property, they nonetheless remained true to Marshall's common-law view of both
"injury" and "legal right."1 03
Major changes in those requirements began in the 1920s. Sutherland himself was
something of a transition figure, suggesting obliquely in Frothingham v. Mellonl04 that
the "legal right" requirement was a limit on the Court's power of judicial review and
hence that it implicated separation of powers principles.105 The inspiration for that
suggestion, however, was likely the doctrine's true innovator, Justice Louis D. Brandeis.
Writing for the Court the previous year, Brandeis had declared that the "case or
controversy" language of Article III mandated the injury requirement.106 'No previous
decision," Lee explains, "had attributed a plaintiff's ineligibility to go forward to Article
III.",107 The injury requirement thus became the foundation of a new "standing" doctrine,
one that not only created a bar that was preliminary to and separate from the merits of a
claim but also one that purportedly imposed on the federal judiciary an explicitly
constitutional limitation.lo0
More changes soon followed. Between the 1940s and 1970s the "legal injury"
requirement gradually gave way to a less technical "injury in fact" standard, a change
that liberal justices saw as a method of reducing the standing bar. Then, beginning in the
1970s, the Court reversed course as more conservative justices added two new
limitations to the "injury in fact" requirement: plaintiffs had to show that their injury was
"fairly traceable" to the actions of defendants and that it was likely to be "redressed" by
judicial remedy. The first limitation essentially duplicated-and, as a threshold matter,
thereby heightened-causal showings commonly necessary on the merits, and the second
created barriers against public interest suits that sought to check or compel government
actions. Together, the expanded standing requirements enabled courts to dismiss more
actions at earlier stages and often without discovery. On a parallel track, new statutes
authorizing suit by parties "aggrieved" by federal regulatory actions raised the issue of
the extent to which Congress could confer standing on claimants. The Court swung back
and forth in its decisions as different justices sought to accommodate or restrict various
kinds of regulatory challenges, but under the growing influence of its conservative
members in the late twentieth century it gradually came to insist that Article III imposed
limits on congressional as well as judicial power. Although the doctrine remained
imprecise and ambiguous, it ensured that "the courts would have the final say on

103. LEE, supra note 100, at 32-35 (discussing Justices Brewer and Peckham); id at 77 (discussing Justice
Sutherland).
104. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (consolidated with Frothinghamv. Mellon).
105. LEE, surpanote 100, at 39.
106. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
107. LEE, supra note 100, at 40. "[T]he doctrine of Article III standing," Lee declares, simply "did not exist
until the 1920s." Id. at 190.
108. Brandeis's success in using Article III to constitutionalize "standing" doctrine may have encouraged
him to try to use it again as a bar to prevent the federal courts from issuing declaratory judgments and, further,
to block congressional efforts to authorize the federal courts to grant such relief. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 124-32 (2000).
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standing in agency cases."l09 Subsequent adaptations and modifications confirmed both
the pliability of "standing" doctrine and its practical power to limit Congress and allow
the Court to regulate the content and flow of federal litigation.
Lee aptly places his history of standing within a broader history of ideas about
"judicial restraint," showing that standing was just one of many "avoidance" doctrines
the Court developed after the 1920s. Here, too, Brandeis was key. The Justice who
constitutionalized standing also urged a variety of other theories that would constrain the
federal judiciary-statutory presumptions, limits on judicial competence, dangers of
premature or unnecessary decisions, and prudential reasons for deferring to the expertise
of Congress, the states, and administrative agencies. 110 Following Brandeis's lead,
Justice Felix Frankfurter added new emphases of his own. He expanded standing into a
more overtly discretionary doctrine, broadened the reach of many of Brandeis's
avoidance techniques, and transformed federalism into an independent rationale for
confining the power of the federal judiciary.I "For Frankfurter," Lee declares, "judicial
restraint became an article of faith." 1 12 Over the succeeding decades the Court came to
praise the generalized wisdom of "judicial restraint" and frequently, if erratically,
employed a variety of amorphous and often overtly discretionary grounds for limiting or
rejecting a range of diverse types of cases. 113
Lee argues that the doctrinal transformation that began in the 1920s was rooted in
two causes: an intellectual and cultural shift from "Protestant idealism to secular and
scientific pragmatism" and a political reaction against the "conservative" federal courts
that drove progressives to seek ways to limit their power.114 Thus, Brandeis's pathbreaking efforts to create doctrines of judicial avoidance were inspired by his
jurisprudential pragmatism and driven by practical political and social considerations. In
his hands, standing became "a tool to protect the ability of the executive and legislative
branches to deal with modem social and economic problems."1' 5 Succeeding judicial
generations learned Brandeis's instrumentalist lesson and began to act with a keen eye on
the practical effect that their avoidance doctrines would likely have on selected values
and policies. The Warren Court "sought to dissociate standing from separation of
powers" in order to encourage "public law litigation,"ll6 while the Burger Court relied
on "a free-floating principle of separation of powers" to tighten standing requirements
and "short-circuit" otherwise cognizable suits. 11 7 "Liberal" Justice William Brennan and

109. LEE, supranote 100, at 138; accord id. at 87, 90.
110. Brandeis drew many of these together in his famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). LEE, supra note 100, at 68-69.
111. "Equity went from the handmaiden of vested rights to the handmaiden of federalism, from a God-given
remedy for God-given rights to an instrument for the technical accommodation of state and federal interests."
LEE, supra note 100, at 117.
112. Id. at 81.
113. Exemplifying the spread of such discretionary Frankfiirterian ideas, for example, the Court explained in
1996, "[flederal courts abstain out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the
concern is with principles of comity and federalism." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723
(1996) (citation omitted).
114. LEE, supranote 100, at xiii, 41-58, 62-66.
115. Id. at 69.
116. Id at 135, 132.
117. Id. at 154.
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"conservative" Justice Antonin Scalia worked similarly and purposely to mold avoidance
doctrines to advance their favored, if contradictory, social and political policies.
Lee's story of the intellectual and cultural shift in the early twentieth century draws
on an extensive historical literature, but it nonetheless requires qualification. On the
"Protestant idealism" side, he equates "Langdellian[ism]" and the "Lochner Court" with
a "pious obstinacy toward instrumental thinking" and a belief that "answers" to all legal
questions were "accessible through principles already within the system."ll8 Further, he
contrasts those shared attitudes with the empirical and consequentialist approach of
pragmatists like Brandeis and Frankfurter. Both the equation and the contrast are
problematic. Whatever committed "Langdellians" might have believed, 1 19 the "Lochner
Court" operated on its own distinct ideological and policy-based grounds. Its
"principles" and "logic" were shot through with implicit value judgments, socially biased
meanings, and, above all, substantive assumptions about desired social consequences. It
was every bit as practical and consequentialist as were the later pragmatists.120 Indeed, if
the "Lochner Court" was guided by "principles" and "logic," those later pragmatists
were guided equally by their own distinctive "principles" and "logic." What changed in
the early twentieth century, then, was not just general cultural and intellectual
assumptions but, more immediately, the nature of the society's-and especially the
Court's-prevailing values and goals, practical assessments about the means necessary
to achieve desired ends, and the language, judicial style, and publicly acknowledged selfawareness of those who made the decisions and provided their legal justification. 12 1
Like both Gerber and Shugerman, Lee is equally determined to address
contemporary issues. As Gerber added his "Appendix" and Shugerman his last two
chapters, Lee includes a jurisprudential "Postscript" that warns against the dangers of
broad, discretionary theories of judicial restraint. There, he traces the use of democratic
ideas to restrict the judiciary from the "Frankfurterian"l22 writings of Alexander Bickel
and the "legal process" school of the 1960s to the broader arguments of contemporary
"popular constitutionalists" who draw Gerber's fire. The former group maintained that a

118. Id.at47-50.
119. There is evidence that so-called "Langdellians" - presumably certain academic systematizers in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - had relatively little in common with the values of the "Lochner
Court." See id at 49; see, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REv. 1 (1983). On the
variety of academic thinking during the period, see WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC & EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN
OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994); Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral
Basis of ClassicalLegal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1513 (2001).
120. Marshall used an obviously collusive suit in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), to provide
constitutional protections for property rights, while Brewer "was unconcerned with notions of federalism or
technical limits on jurisdiction" and happy to advance "a breathtakingly broad interpretation of equity
jurisprudence" to serve the same cause. LEE, supra note 100, at 12-18, 21, 24. See generally Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., Ex parte Young and the Transformationof the FederalCourts, 1890-1917,40 U. TOL. L. REv. 931
(2009); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race,
History, and "FederalCourts," 81 N.C. L. REv. 1927 (2003).
121. Lee argues that we must recognize the nature and extent of the Court's discretion in construing Article
III, and that justices must check themselves constantly with an acute self-consciousness about their actual
motives and goals in shaping their doctrinal formulations. Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., he
warns that failure to consider the influence of such personal factors "is simply to leave the very ground and
foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious." LEE, surpa note 101, at 53 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
122. LEE, supra note 100, at 196.
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"restrained" judiciary served democratic values by leaving most matters to be decided by
the elective branches of government, while later "popular constitutionalists" expanded
that theme by arguing more comprehensively that "the people" were supreme and
consequently that they, not the Court, properly held final authority over all constitutional
questions.
Lee offers a wise, measured, and essentially negative assessment of both earlier
and later versions. First, he points out that "the people" have, in fact, controlled the
meaning of the Constitution over the long sweep of the nation's history and that the
Court has generally, if unevenly, adapted its rules to accord with changing popular
views.123 Contemporary "popular constitutionalism," then, is essentially misguided, for
the Court's "supreme" authority is "limited to provisional control" 124 that extends over
the relatively short run only.12 5 When popular opposition to its decisions is "sufficiently
intense and enduring, the Court will eventually relent." 126
Second, affirming the values of "institutional settlement" and the desirability of
legal regularity and order, Lee argues that the Court is the institution best suited to
interpret the Constitution consistently and predictably in the short run and, hence, that it
is best suited to serve those fundamental social needs. 127 Thus, the Court's "supremacy"
is necessary as a practical matter in the nation's day-to-day affairs, though-also as a
practical matter-it is subject in the long run to the public's approval or rejection.
Finally, considering the democratic rhetoric used to justify theories of both judicial
restraint and popular constitutionalism, Lee invokes the lesson of the story he has told:
"the actual development of the judicial restraint doctrines was the product of forces more
varied and more complicated than a simple desire to protect democracy, or simple
obedience to the principles of constitutional government."l28 Thus, he concludes, the
standard assertion that "judicial restraint" serves democratic values is highly
questionable. The practice of "restraint" should "not be given a free pass"l29 but must,
instead, be scrutinized in every individual context to determine what particular results it
actually brings. "We must insist on real benefits in light of what we already know is the
cost of the judicial restraint doctrines." 1 30 That cost, Lee makes clear, is that the courts
may refuse to enforce the law and protect the rights of individuals. "For a person who is
131
told his rights are without remedies, the promise of law is an empty one indeed."
123. See id. at 218 (citing BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. On this point Lee cites and seems to accept the views of Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer. Id at
216; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, I10 HARV. L. REV.
1359 (1997); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 455 (2000).
128. LEE, supranote 100, at 219.
129. Id.
130. Id. Compare id, with KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 154-55 (2009)
(arguing that direct democracy has limited efforts to expand individual rights in a number of areas, including
affirmative action, bilingual education, marriage, and criminal law).
131. LEE, supra note 100, at 219; accord id. at 193. For a thoughtful examination of the Court's many
"restraint" doctrines co-authored by one of Gerber's leading "popular constitutionalists," see John A. Ferejohn
& Larry D. Kramer, IndependentJudges, Dependent Judiciary:InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U.
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Lee's probing analysis underscores the ironies and confusions that resulted from
the Court's avoidance doctrines. Most obvious, the practical significance of the doctrines
shifted as the political orientation of the federal judiciary swung between political poles
and the likely social consequences of federal adjudication changed. Less obvious, but
equally important, unintended ambiguities appeared in the shifting legal formulations
that the Court gave to its avoidance doctrines, forcing the creation of ever more
qualifications and restatements. Indeed, Lee maintains, by the beginning of the twentyfirst century the Court's standing doctrine had become essentially incoherent, showing
that it was "not a rule of constitutional law" at all but merely a rough and flexible "policy
norm."1 32
Thus, like Shugerman, Lee highlights the complicated and ambiguous nature of the
ideal of judicial independence. The "independence" of Article III courts fails to
guarantee consistency and stability in either the specific rules of law or the judiciary's
own orientation and sense of purpose. Further, it fails to insulate the courts from the
influence of broad social and political changes or the personal attitudes and goals of
individual judges, what Lee calls their "lens of substantive values." 1 33 Thus, while an
independent judiciary remains a high ideal, Lee confirms-as did Shugerman from a
different perspective-that such abstractions are of little analytical value in thinking
seriously about the practical meaning and significance of that ideal. 134
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM PAST TO FUTURE

Lee and Gerber occupy much common ground. Both reject contemporary theories
of "popular constitutionalism" and emphasize the fundamental role the courts should
play in protecting individual rights. They nonetheless part company in identifying the
danger presented. For Gerber, the danger is that "popular" forces may compromise or
destroy the judiciary's "independence" by overruling its decisions or overthrowing its
authority. For Lee, the danger is that the Court may withhold its judgment and allow
disfavored individual rights to suffer. Gerber worries that outsiders might come to
pressure the Court and twist the law, while Lee worries that insiders have been doing
exactly that all along.
Both worries accentuate the gravity and immediacy of the problem that Shugerman
highlights. If, as Gerber fears, outside pressures of "popular constitutionalism" threaten
the courts, the most immediate and potentially devastating contemporary danger to
judicial independence is the rise of "judicial plutocracy." And if, as Lee believes, "the

L. REv. 962 (2002) (arguing that the Constitution embodies ideals of both judicial accountability and judicial
independence and that, in response, the Court has developed a range of "restraint" doctrines designed to
implement that balance).
132. LEE, supra note 100, at 188, 193.
133. Id. at 205. Lee comments on JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw (1980). He doubts the ability of judges to prevent "blockage in the political process" without
consulting their own values. Id.
134. For a thoughtful effort to locate an appropriate judicial balance between "independence" and
"accountability," and between "law" and "politics," see Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the
Past, Present, and Future: Precedent, Politics and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 19 (2005);
Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, JudicialAccountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J.
909 (2007).
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lens of substantive values" is an inherent part of judging, then the forces of "judicial
plutocracy" have a compelling incentive to pursue ever more aggressively and
elaborately their campaigns to pack the bench with those offering a fostering lens.
Recognition of those facts should compel Americans to rethink quite carefully
what the ideal of an "independent judiciary" actually means and how, in practice, it can
most effectively be achieved. For Gerber, the answer lies in certain basic principles and
an "original" natural rights philosophy.1 3 5 In their diverse ways, however, both
Shugerman and Lee make it clear that problems involving "judicial independence" are
complex and that abstract ideals are of little use in grappling with them. While the
possibility of either forging agreement on principles of natural rights or altering the
nature of the judicial process itself seem doubtful, the possibility of reforming judicial
selection and retention procedures-including the increasingly dysfunctional process at
the federal level - seems somewhat more practical. Surely Shugerman is right in
pointing us toward the gravest current threat to our "independent" judiciaries.
Whether effective reforms can actually be achieved, of course, would seem to
depend in large part on whether the many deleterious legal, political, and economic
trends of the past half-century could be checked or reversed. That possibility may be
doubted. Still, the enduring ideal of judicial independence and the highly prized values it
promises-one point on which all three authors agree-should warrant our most
strenuous efforts to reshape our law and institutions in ways that will honor the ideal in
practice and secure, to the greatest extent possible, its promised benefits.

135. For a recent analysis and critique of "originalism" that reviews much of the literature, see Geoffrey
Schotter, Diachronic Constitutionalism:A Remedy for the Court's OriginalistFixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1241 (2010).

